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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
he would eat the lamb anyhow. However badly the treasury may
need meat it is the hope of the writer that the bona fide property
distinctions of the states will continue to be recognized as they
are in the majority opinion of the, case under discussion and that
more tax money, if needed, will be raised by other methods than
by overruling a line of decisions which were considered in the
light of the community property system as such and not as a
foregone conclusion which would bring more money into the
treasury.
HARRIET S. DAGGETT*
COMMUNITY PROPERTY-COST OF ADMINISTRATION-The surviv-
ing spouse of Vaccaro became, at his death, the full owner of one-
half of the community property. Vaccaro's estate was settled, but
there were considerable charges upon the estate: attorneys' fees,
executrix's commission, and other costs of administration. These
amounted to more than seventy-three thousand dollars. Plaintiff,
the surviving spouse, attempted to deduct these charges from her
husband's gross estate under Section 303, Revenue Act of 1926,
as amended. The commissioner refused, and allowed only the
deduction of one-half of the charges, asserting that one-half of
such expenses were incurred in the administration of the widow's
one-half of the community estate. Held, the entire amount is
deductible from the decedent's gross estate because, since the
community terminated at the death of the husband, it was no
longer capable of being charged with expenses and no part should
be charged to the half of the community owned by the surviving
spouse. Vaccaro v. United States, 4 Prentice-Hall 1944 Fed. Tax
Serv. 62,646, C.C.H. Fed. Estate and Inheritance Tax Serv.
10,129 (E.D. La. 1944).
This decision is based largely upon a ruling by Justice Odom
in Succession of Lewis1 to the effect that "all costs of the admin-
istration should be paid out of the estate of the deceased, and that
the community was not liable for any portion thereof."2 In sup-
port of his ruling, Justice Odom cites Succession of Solis' and
Succession of Pizatti.4 These cases, however, are authority only
* Professor of Civil Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 192 La. 734, 189 So. 118 (1939).
2. 192 La. 734, 743, 189 So. 118, 121 (1939).
S. 10 La. App. 109, 119 So. 768 (1929).
4. 141 La. 645, 75 So. 498 (1917).
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for the charging of funeral, expenses against the estate of the
deceased. No mention is made there of attorneys' fees or the
executor's commission or other costs of administration. Further-
more the analogy presented by the funeral expense cases is not
a proper one, for there the' expenses were properly charged
against the estate of the deceased; also, cases where the husband
is charged with his wife's funeral expenses are grounded on the
theory that the husband 'is liable because of his duty to support
his wife and furnish her with necessities.5
On the contrary, a different rule was announced in Succession
of Webre,6 Sims v. Billington,' and Succession of Bothick.8 Those
decisions are directly in point, and hold that the costs of settling
the succession and the community (attorneys' fees, court costs,
administrator's fees) are chargeable against the combined com-
munity and separate estate. This is done before the estate is
divided, and each recipient thus pays his share in proportion to
his interest.
It follows that, in view of these prior decisions, Justice Odom
erred in his conclusion in the Lewis case,9 quoted above. And if
the Lewis opinion is out of line, it is clear that Judge Borah's
decision in the principal case, which depends upon the Lewis
case as the authoritative statement of Louisiana law, shares the
same error.
A second reason advanced in support of the decision in the
Vaccaro case is that a community of acquets and gains is ter-
minated upon the death of either spouse, and the community,
being no longer in esse, cannot be charged with the costs of
administration which necessarily are incurred after its dissolu-
tion. However, it has been held that the community has a ficti-
tious existence for the purpose of liquidation and settlement of
community debts after its dissolution by death of the spouse, or
by judgment;10 and in proceedings to settle community existing
between the spouses until dissolved by judgment of separation,
costs of such proceedings have been properly taxed against the
community."
5. Note (1935) 9 Tulane L. Rev. 440.
6. 49 La. Ann. 1491, 22 So. 390 (1897).
7. 50 La. Ann. 968, 24 So. 637 (1898).
8. 52 La. Ann. 1880, 28 So. 458 (1900).
9. Succession of Lewis, 192 La. 734, 189 So. 118 (1939).
19. Succession of Dumestre, 42 La. Ann. 411, 7 So. 624 (1890);
10. Succession of Dumestre, 42 La. Ann. 411, 7 So. 624 (1890); Tomme v.
Tomme, 174 La. 123, 139 So. 901 (1932).
11. Vicknair v. Terracina, 168 La. 417, 122 So. 276 (1929).
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In Succession of Bertrand it was said: "Whatever rights the
wife might have under the regime of the community were to be
found, at the death of the husband, already inside the husband's
succession, and to be taken out therefrom only after full settle-
ment. The wife's rights were residuary in character.' 1 2
The commission of the administrator or the executor of the
community property is fixed to the full extent of that property.
His services are rendered for the benefit of all parties concerned
therein and are to be paid for by all parties who may be inter-
ested. Where the husband dies the commission of the executor
of his estate is based upon the community, and it would seem to
follow that such commission would be deductible from the com-
munity and not solely from the husband's half thereof.13
Furthermore, although the community is not a partnership
in the usual commercial sense,1 4 the wife's interest in the com-
munity is not substantially different from that of a member of a
limited or an ordinary partnership,15 and the theory of dissolu-
tion and settlement of the community may be said to be similar
to that of the settlement of an ordinary partnership. The costs of
settling the community should be borne by the portions of both
partners, even though they accrued after the death of the spouse,
as the entity is presumed to continue until its assests are finally
settled, although at the time it is not a going concern. This would
be true not only of a community dissolved by the death of the
spouse; it applies with equal force to divorce, for the divorced
wife is in the same situation as a widow.16
The legislature has provided that at the dissolution for any
cause of the marriage community the wife can renounce her
portion1.7 or she may accept the community of acquets and gains
under the benefit of inventory, in the same manner and with the
same benefits and advantages as heirs are allowed by existing
12. 123 La. 784, 790, 49 So. 524, 526 (1909).
13. Succession of McCan, 49 La. Ann. 968, 22 So. 225 (1897); Succession
of Pierce, 119 La. 727, 44 So. 446 (1907).
14. Art. 2807, La. Civil Code of 1870.
15. Brief on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae In Flournoy v.
Wiener (1944) 38 [Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253, 64 S.Ct. 548, 88 L.Ed. 478
(1944)]. Succession of Wiener, 203 La. 649, 657, 14 So.(2d) 475, 477 (1943):
"That this community Is a partnership in which the husband and the wife
own equal shares . . . is well settled in this state." Mabie v. Whittaker, 10
Wash. 656, 662, 39 Pac. 172, 174 (1895): "'The fundamental idea of the com-
munity system is that marriage makes the man and woman partners.'"
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Skov, 51 F. Supp. 470, 474 (D. C. Ore. 1943):
"The community is in the nature of a partnership (under the community
property doctrine]."
16. Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926).
17. Art. 2410, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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laws to accept a succession under the benefit of inventory,18 and
this'acceptance is merely an expression of her consent to receive
the residue of the community, if any, after the debts of the com-
munity are paid.19
The above indicates that the right of the wife to the share
of the community is residuary in character, and administration is
a step which necessarily must be taken in order to find out what
that residue is. The costs thereof are for a service rendered to
the community as a whole, and are necessary to accomplish a
purpose without which the portions of the different parties could
not be identified. Consequently it is obvious that these costs
should be sustained by the entity.
A.C.
TESTAMENTARY CAPAcITY-THE EFFECT OF INTERDICTION-The
sister of John Lanata, deceased; instituted suit to annul the will
of her brother for want of testamentary capacity. John Lanata
had been interdicted in 1904 under Article 422 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870 and the judgment continued in full force and
effect until his death in 1942. Plaintiff rests her case entirely on
the judgment of interdiction. Defendant testamentary executor
filed an exception of no cause of action and urged that the mere
judgment of interdiction did not deprive testator of testamentary
capacity. Held, exception of no cause of action sustained. "With
the conclusion reached then that R. C. C. Articles 402 and 403 are
not applicable to testaments, it would seem to follow, and we
hold, that testaments are likewise excluded from the preceding
codal provision, Article 401, which is the one that declares null
all acts done by the persons interdicted."' An interdicted person
can make a valid will, and the absence of an allegation that the
testator was of unsound mind at the time of making the will is
fatal to the validity of the petition. Succession of, Lancta, 18 So.
(2d) 500 (La. 1944).
This case presents for determination a question that is res
nova in Louisiana jurisprudence-Does interdiction alone destroy
the interdict's capacity to make a valid will?
In order to determine who may dispose of property by dona-
tion mortis causa the articles of the Civil Code specifically dealing
18. La. Act 4 of 1882, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2213).
19. Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926).
1. Succession of Lanata, 18 So.(2d) 500, 505 (La. 1944).
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